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The Case of Ralph
Slavery is one of the oldest of human institutions. 
Among the ancient Assyrians, Persians, and He­
brews slaves were more numerous than free men, 
while in Greece and Rome property in man was 
regarded as essential to social welfare. In America, 
negro slaves were introduced at Jamestown before 
the arrival of the Mayflower at Plymouth, and 
during the colonial period the importation of slaves 
from Africa constituted an important part of for­
eign commerce. By the dawn of the nineteenth 
century, civilization in its westward course had 
reached the banks of the Mississippi and negro 
slavery was about to be extended into the vast ex­
panse of the Louisiana Purchase. Thus the region 
that is Iowa became involved in the issues of slavery. 
It is indeed significant that the first case decided by 
the Iowa Territorial Supreme Court should have 
dealt with human freedom.
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In the year of 1834 a slave owner named Mont­
gomery living in Missouri made a written contract 
with his slave, Ralph, in which he agreed that Ralph 
should become free in consideration of the payment 
of five hundred and fifty dollars. That he might be 
able to earn the purchase money, Ralph obtained 
permission to leave Missouri and to seek employ­
ment in a more remunerative region. He had heard 
that a fortune awaited anyone with a strong back 
and a willing spirit in the lead mines of Dubuque, 
Iowa. It was reported that the ore yielded “ about 
80 per cent of lead”, and if a miner were so fortu­
nate as to discover a productive vein, accessible from 
a hillside, he could form a drift and very conveni­
ently convey the ore out in wheelbarrows at a trifling- 
expense. This, Ralph thought, was his opportunity, 
and accordingly he made his way to Dubuque, where 
he worked industriously at mining for nearly five 
years. But in all that time he neither discovered 11 a 
productive vein” nor accumulated any money or 
other resources with which to pay Montgomery for 
his freedom.
Dubuque was “ a typical mining town” in the 
thirties. The population included a heterogeneous 
group of Spanish, French, Irish, Germans, and 
a few negroes. Almost without exception they were 
miners, and men of the roughest sort. Their amuse­
ments consisted chiefly of gambling and in drinking 
“ the most villainous whisky”. It was not uncom­
mon for a miner to work only until he had accumu-
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lated sufficient funds for a “ spree” and then, “ until 
cleaned out at keeno” or some other game, to alter­
nate between being “ drunk enough to howl and 
fight” and “ too drunk to do either”. Acts of 
extreme violence were rare because a semblance of 
government enforced certain rules with “ inflexible 
impartiality”, but lesser crimes, including robbing 
and even kidnapping, were not uncommon.
Among the rogues who came to Dubuque during 
these early years were two Virginians, who learned 
of Ralph’s contract with Montgomery and resolved 
to capitalize upon the young negro’s unfortunate 
situation. They wrote to Montgomery offering to 
capture Ralph and return him to Missouri for one 
hundred dollars. Although Montgomery probably 
had not previously intended to interfere with 
Ralph’s freedom, he seems to have welcomed this 
offer and contracted for Ralph’s recovery.
Meanwhile the Territory of Iowa had been organ­
ized. The rules of conduct which had been only 
rudely enforced by the miners themselves had been 
superseded by more formal law, and regular courts 
had been established. Prominent among the stat­
utes enacted by the First Legislative Assembly of 
Iowa was an “ Act to regulate Blacks and Mulat- 
toes” passed in January, 1839. This law provided 
that if any person claiming a negro as a slave should 
make satisfactory proof before a judge of the dis­
trict court or justice of the peace that the person 
claimed was his property, the magistrate should
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thereupon order the sheriff or constable to arrest 
the fugitive and deliver him to the claimant. More­
over, the provisions in various acts of Congress 
relating to the rendition of fugitive slaves were 
applicable in Iowa and enforceable in the Territorial 
courts.
Relying upon these laws the kidnappers proceeded 
to make affidavit before a magistrate in Dubuque, 
alleging that Ralph was the property of Montgomery 
of Missouri, and the sheriff, George W. Cummins, 
was ordered to deliver the negro to them. Ralph was 
found working on a mineral lot west of town. He 
was arrested and given into the custody of the Vir­
ginians who loaded him into a wagon. Avoiding the 
town of Dubuque for fear of interference, they took 
their captive to Bellevue, a little farther down the 
river, intending to convey him thence by steamboat 
to Missouri.
Fortunately for Ralph, however, the seizure was 
observed by Alexander Butterworth, who chanced to 
be plowing in an adjoining field. Butterworth imme­
diately went to the residence of Thomas S. Wilson, 
judge of the Territorial district court and also one 
of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of 
the Territory and procured from him a writ of 
habeas corpus for the benefit of the captive. Acting 
upon the authority of this writ the sheriff pursued 
the kidnappers, overtook them at Bellevue and 
returned with them and the negro to the district 
court at Dubuque.
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"When the case came before Judge Wilson, he 
recognized the importance of the question involved 
and suggested that the suit be transferred to the 
Supreme Court of the Territory, which had not yet 
begun to function as a judicial organ. Accordingly, 
the Ralph case was the first to be presented and 
came before that tribunal for adjudication at the 
July term in 1839.
The rights of Ralph were presented by David 
Rorer of Burlington, one of the most popular and 
able attorneys in the Territory. Mr. Rorer contend­
ed that Ralph, being a resident of the Territory of 
Wisconsin prior to the organization of the Territory 
of Iowa and also a resident of Iowa Territory at the 
time of the passage of the act of Congress creating 
the Territory, became free by the operation of that 
law. He asserted that the Organic Act was espe­
cially designed to cover such cases in that it ex­
pressly extended to the inhabitants of Iowa the 
benefits of the Ordinance of 1787 under which the 
Iowa country had previously been governed. Thus 
the inhabitants of the Old Northwest Territory, and 
by application the residents of the Iowa country, 
were guaranteed the rights of habeas corpus and 
trial by jury, while slavery was forever excluded.
Irrespective of the provisions of the Organic Act 
or the Ordinance of 1787, Mr. Rorer argued, Ralph 
had become free as soon as he had come to live in 
Iowa with the consent of his master, by virtue of the 
provisions of the Missouri Compromise, which pro­
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hibited slavery in the territory north of the parallel 
of 36° 30', except in the State of Missouri. In sup­
port of this proposition, the attorney cited an Eng­
lish case in which the court decided that a slave 
owner had no right to take a former slave, free by 
virtue of having lived in a free country, to any region 
where by the aid of human law he might be reduced 
again to slavery. Such action was held to be re­
pugnant to reason and the principles of natural law.
Even if it had been admitted that Ralph was a 
fugitive slave, the arguments of his attorney were 
calculated to convince the court that he could not 
legally be returned to his former master. But Mr. 
Rorer claimed that Ralph was not a fugitive — that 
he could not be considered as either coming into or 
remaining in the Territory in violation of the law. 
He had come to Iowa not as a fugitive from service 
but by the voluntary consent of his former owner. 
Montgomery by permitting his slave to go to a terri­
tory where slavery was prohibited “ virtually manu­
mitted such slave”. The very act of his contracting 
presupposed a state of freedom on the part of the 
slave. If Montgomery had any right of action, it 
was for the collection of the money Ralph had agreed 
to pay.
On behalf of Montgomery the case was argued by 
John Y. Berry of Dubuque and another attorney. 
They contended that Ralph, having failed to perform 
his part of the contract by paying the price of his 
freedom, was to be regarded as still in slavery, hence
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a fugitive slave and subject to the provisions of the 
fugitive slave law. They denied that slavery was 
prohibited in the Territory of Iowa, because the 
Missouri Compromise was not intended to take di­
rect effect but should be construed as authorizing the 
local legislatures to pass laws prohibiting slavery 
within the described limits. But even if the Mis­
souri Compromise were intended to operate without 
further legislation, they argued, it did not work a 
forfeiture of slave property and would in this case 
do no more than require Montgomery to remove his 
property out of the Territory.
It might be pointed out that although the Missouri 
Compromise did not, in express terms, declare a for­
feiture of slave property, it did, in effect, declare 
that such property could not exist in certain places. 
In the words of Justice Charles Mason, “ Property, 
in the slave, cannot exist without the existence of 
slavery: the prohibition of the latter annihilates the 
former, and, this being destroyed, he becomes free.”
The presentation of the case by both sides was 
accompanied with ingenious arguments, cunningly 
devised to captivate the interest and secure the sym­
pathy of the newly organized court. Judge Mason 
in rendering the decision prefaced his remarks with 
a frank acknowledgment that the case had not come 
before the tribunal in the ordinarv way, and that it 
was, “ perhaps, not strictly regular” for the court to 
entertain jurisdiction at all. He realized, however, 
that the case involved an important question, “ which
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may ere long, if unsettled, become an exciting one ’ \ 
Accordingly, lie said, “ we concluded to listen to the 
argument, and make a decision in the case without 
intending it as a precedent for future practice in this 
Court. ”
After reviewing the facts and circumstances of the 
case, the judge stated the unanimous opinion of the 
court that Montgomery, in granting Ralph the privi­
lege of entering a free Territory, thereby gave him 
freedom and could not again take him into a slave 
State. Slavery did not and could not exist in Iowa, 
and if a slave with his master’s consent became a 
resident of a free State or Territory he could not be 
regarded thereafter as a fugitive slave, nor could 
the master under such circumstances exercise any 
right of ownership over him. When the master ap­
plied to the courts for the purpose of controlling as 
property that which the laws declared should not be 
property, the Judge thought it was incumbent upon 
the court to refuse cooperation. Ralph was there­
fore discharged and allowed to go free.
In rendering its first decision the Supreme Court 
of the Territory of Iowa established an enviable rep­
utation for dealing judiciously with a fundamental 
issue. Few cases since have involved more impor­
tant matters or presented more clearly the question 
of human rights. Moreover, the Ralph case is of 
particular interest because of its striking similarity 
with the famous Bred Scott case decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in 1856.
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Dred Scott like Ralph had been a slave in Mis­
souri. He had been taken by John Emerson, his 
master, to places in Illinois where slavery was pro­
hibited by the Ordinance of 1787 and by the State 
Constitution, and to a place in Minnesota where 
slavery was excluded by the Missouri Compromise. 
Scott returned with his master to Missouri without 
protest, but after several years brought suit for his 
freedom in the State courts against his master’s 
widow on the ground of former residence in free 
territory. In 1852 the Supreme Court of Missouri 
decided against Scott. The case was then taken into 
the Federal courts and was eventually carried to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney expressed the view that no negro 
could possibly be a citizen in the constitutional sense, 
whatever action a State might take with regard to 
him, for the Constitution was not intended to apply 
to any but the white race. The negroes, he said, 
were considered at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution “ so far inferior, that thev had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect”. 
Hence Dred Scott could not sue in the United States 
courts as a citizen of Missouri.
Having denied Scott’s right to sue, the Chief Jus­
tice was bound in logic to dismiss the case, but 
instead of doing so he took up the question of the 
slave’s freedom, as affected by his residence in 
Minnesota and Illinois, and rendered an opinion in 
which he declared that Scott was not entitled to free-
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dom. Justice John McLean and Justice Benjamin 
R. Curtis each rendered dissenting opinions, but 
despite the able argument of these men the ideas of 
the Chief Justice prevailed and Scott was denied his 
freedom.
Throughout the two cases of Scott and Ralph 
there are striking parallels and contrasts. Except 
that Scott was actually taken back into slavery after 
having lived in a free State while Ralph denied the 
right of his former master to take him back into a 
slave State, the facts are much the same. The per­
sonnel of the two courts also presents striking simi­
larities as well as radical differences. Chief Justice 
Taney was a Jacksonian Democrat, an advocate of 
State rights, and a pro-slavery man, while the judges 
in the Ralph case, likewise all members of the Demo­
cratic party, were, in contrast with Judge Taney, 
opposed to slaver}^  on principle. The points of law 
presented to these two groups of judges were almost 
identical yet the Ralph case does not seem to have 
been considered in the Dred Scott decision which was 
directly contradictory. Scott died before the final 
settlement of his case, but had he lived he would 
have remained a slave.
Although the Dred Scott case presented one of the 
outstanding issues of the slavery period, its decision 
has been criticized as political rather than judicial. 
The Ralph case, on the contrary, ranks high as a 
judicial decision, and the decisive recognition of 
fundamental human rights is a tribute to the wisdom
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and foresight of the Justices of the Iowa court. For 
two decades before the Civil War the decision in the 
Ralph case pointed the way to justice and freedom. 
No longer a mooted question, the decision now stands 
in the archives of Iowa history as a bright page in 
the struggle against slavery.
Having obtained his freedom, Ralph continued to 
reside at Dubuque and work in the lead mines. 
Eventually, it is reported, his labors were rewarded 
by the discovery of ‘ ‘ a rich lode ’ ’. This would have 
enabled him to fulfill the terms of his contract with 
Montgomery, but being free from this obligation he 
found other ways of using his wealth. Too long in 
the environment of the mining camp to resist the 
temptation to gamble, he lost his mine in a game of 
chance. Though he died in poverty and the location 
of his grave is unknown, Ralph could not have wished 
for a monument more enduring than the first deci­
sion of the Supreme Court of Iowa.
J. A. S wisher
